The Effect of External Finance and Internal Capital Markets on the Equilibrium Allocation of Capital by Almeida, Heitor & Wolfenzon, Daniel
The Effect of External Finance and Internal Capital Markets on
the Equilibrium Allocation of Capital∗
Heitor Almeida Daniel Wolfenzon†
September 03, 2002
Abstract
We model the equilibrium allocation of capital in the presence of imperfect institutional
development. In our model, imperfect institutional development reduces external market
activity by limiting capital flows among firms, thus compromising the efficiency of economy
wide capital allocation. We show that the efficiency of capital allocation increases with
firms’ external financing requirements because higher external financing requirements lead
to more liquidation of projects and a more active external capital market. Furthermore,
a higher degree of conglomeration reduces external market activity because conglomerates
allocate capital internally rather than supply it to the market. Thus, the efficiency of capital
allocation may decrease in the presence of conglomerates, even when they allocate capital
internally to their most productive units. Our results help explain why countries that rely
heavily on external finance also have high productivity and growth, and they provide a new
perspective on the recent debate about the desirability of dismantling business groups in
developing countries. The fact that the main results of the paper run against the intuition
obtained from partial equilibrium models shows the importance of modeling financial imper-
fections in an equilibrium framework in order to derive implications about overall economic
efficiency.
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1 Introduction
Recent research reveals that the level of institutional development is an important determinant
of financial variables. In a series of papers, La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny
(1997, 1998, 1999, 2000a, 2002) show that the extent of legal protection of outside investors
against expropriation by the manager or ‘insiders’ affects the size of the external capital mar-
kets, ownership and control concentration, dividend policy, the number and value of publicly
traded firms, etc.1 Moreover, institutional development seems to affect real variables such as the
efficiency of capital allocation in an economy. Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998) and Ra-
jan and Zingales (1998) show that firms or industries that are in need of relatively more finance
grow faster in countries with active stock markets and developed legal systems. Wurgler (2000)
shows that better investor protection leads to a more efficient use of capital in the economy.2
Our understanding of the ways institutional development affects an individual firm’s decisions
has advanced considerably. La Porta et al (1999) and Bebchuck (1999) explain why poor investor
protection leads to concentrated control. La Porta et al. (2002) show that firm valuation is
higher in countries with better legal protection of shareholders. Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002)
present a model that shows how investor protection affects ownership concentration, dividend
policy, the size of the external equity market, firm valuation, the size of private benefits of
control, and the number of firms going public. However, the theoretical link between institutional
development and the efficiency of economy-wide capital allocation has received less attention.3
In this paper we propose a framework to study this link. Our starting point is that institutional
development affects activity in external capital markets. In particular, lack of institutional
development reduces reallocation of capital across firms and projects in the economy. Our main
contribution is to show that in a situation where capital reallocation is distorted by a lack of
institutional development, an increase in firms’ external financing needs, or a decrease in the
1See also Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2000a), Kumar, Rajan, and Zingales (1999), and Nenova (2002),
among others.
2Perhaps as a result of this better allocation of capital, countries with ‘better’ institutions have also been
shown to grow faster (King and Levine, 1993, Levine and Servos, 1998 and Beck, Levine and Loayza, 2000).
3One exception is Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002). Although their main focus is not the efficiency of capital
allocation, some of their results are relevant to it. We discuss the relation between our paper and Shleifer and
Wolfenzon (2002) after we have explained our results.
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level of conglomeration in the economy, may improve the allocation of capital by stimulating
market activity.
In an environment with imperfect institutional development, entrepreneurs with high pro-
ductivity projects cannot credibly commit to paying back the entire cash flows that their firms
generate since, once they have taken the investors’ money, there may be little investors can
do to get it back. A direct result of this limited pledgeability is that the investments of high
productivity firms are constrained.4 However, this is not the only distortion introduced. Due
to limited pledgeability, firms with mediocre projects are not properly compensated when they
supply their capital to the external market and, as a result, these firms continue their projects
rather than liquidate them. Therefore, even when the demand for capital of high productivity
firms is not satisfied, capital is retained in mediocre projects. That is, lack of institutional
development reduces market activity.
Our main results are as follows. First, if existing projects have raised enough external finance
in the past, they will be liquidated too often (as in Diamond, 1991). This excessive liquidation
is suboptimal for a firm in isolation, but it allows the released capital to flow from mediocre
to high productivity projects, improving the equilibrium allocation. This result suggests an
additional reason why countries that rely heavily on external finance are also countries with high
productivity and growth. The traditional explanation for this correlation is that external finance
is beneficial because, without it, firms would not be able to make the necessary investments.
This argument implies that external finance is beneficial when there are no other sources of
finance. While undoubtedly this is an important role of external finance, our model suggests
that external finance can independently affect the equilibrium allocation of capital by stimulating
market activity.
Our second result is that an increase in the degree of conglomeration (the fraction of projects
in the economy that are in multi-project firms) can decrease the efficiency of capital allocation,
even when these conglomerates allocate capital internally to their best units. A stand alone
4The assumption of limited pledgeability can be justified by the framework in Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002),
who show that higher levels of investor protection (i.e., higher costs of expropriation) lead to lower expropriation
and consequently higher pledgeability. Even though we focus on the institutional environment, limited pledge-
ability can also be a consequence of the inalienability of human capital (Hart and Moore 1994), or moral hazard
in project choice due to private benefits (Holmstrom and Tirole, 1997).
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firm with a worthless project has no better option than to supply the project’s capital to the
external market. This capital can then find its way to a high productivity project. However,
a conglomerate allocates the capital of a worthless project to its best unit, even if this unit is
of mediocre productivity. A conglomerate prefers this internal reallocation even when there are
higher productivity projects in the economy in need of capital. This because the best projects
in the economy cannot properly compensate the conglomerate for its capital, due to limited
pledgeability. In this case, the presence of conglomerates further distorts the equilibrium capital
allocation by reducing the supply of capital to the external market.
According to this argument, the observation that conglomerates allocate capital to their most
productive projects is not a sufficient condition to advocate the presence of conglomerates. For
example, it has been documented that one of the roles of business groups in developing countries
is to allocate capital among member firms (Leff, 1976 and Khanna and Palepu, 1997). Khanna
and Palepu (1999) argue that because business groups provide an important substitute for the
lack of active external capital markets in developing countries, calls for their dismantlement
should be ignored. The result in this model suggests that business groups can simultaneously be
detrimental to capital allocation due to their negative effect on external market activity and be
efficient at allocating capital internally. The dismantling of efficient conglomerates may improve
overall capital allocation by stimulating external market activity.
In general, our two results indicate that one cannot simply extrapolate results obtained
in a partial equilibrium framework. We show that an increase in external finance introduces
inefficiencies at the firm level, yet it can improve the efficiency of economy wide capital allocation.
Similarly, conglomerates can allocate capital to their best units, yet dismantling them could
stimulate external market activity and lead to better capital allocation. This is because changes
that take place at the firm level (e.g., a change in the degree of pledgeability or a need for
external finance) affect firms’ actions directly and also indirectly through their effect on the
external market.
There are several strands of literature related to our paper, the first of which is the literature
on the benefits and costs of liquidation in an equilibrium context. According to the ‘liquida-
tionist’ view (De Long, 1990), the liquidation of existing firms is healthy for the economy since
it releases factors of production that can be used more productively for new projects. This
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position goes back to Schumpeter’s (1942) idea of ‘Creative Destruction’. Contrary to this view,
Caballero and Hammour (1996, 1998, 1999) argue that in an economy with frictions, liquidation
might be excessive since the released factors will end up being unemployed.5 Our model is
consistent with both views. As we show in the paper, for low levels of pledgeability the realloca-
tion market for capital works very poorly, and the capital released by mediocre projects cannot
reach the high productivity ones. In such a case, the liquidation induced by external finance
and deconglomeration cannot improve the equilibrium allocation, as argued by Caballero and
Hammour. However, at higher levels of pledgeability, the reallocation market works better and
the released resources find their way to more productive activities (consistent with De Long and
Schumpeter). In our set up, the degree of frictions (as measured by pledgeability) determines
whether liquidation is beneficial.
Our results are also related to the recent debate about the costs and benefits of internal
capital markets in conglomerates (see Stein, 2001, for a survey). This literature has suggested
that a potential benefit of an internal capital market is its ability to allocate capital efficiently
across divisions (Gertner, Scharfstein and Stein, 1994, Stein 1997, Matsusaka and Nanda, 2002).
The opposite view is that internal capital markets do not allocate capital efficiently, but rather
in a ‘socialistic’ way (Shin and Stulz, 1998, Rajan, Servaes and Zingales, 2000; Scharfstein and
Stein 2000). These papers analyze conglomerates in isolation and thus have no equilibrium
implications.6 Our point is that even when conglomerates improve the internal allocation of
capital, they can decrease the efficiency of the economy-wide allocation because of their negative
impact on market activity. In fact, our argument does not depend on whether internal allocation
of capital in a conglomerate is efficient. The crucial feature driving our results is that, due to
limited pledgeability, conglomerates have a preference towards internal reallocation of capital,
vis-a`-vis external reallocation in the capital market.
The role of active markets has received attention in the literature. Large and more liquid
markets increase incentives for agents to acquire information about firms because when markets
5This is similar to the arguments of Shleifer and Vishny (1992), who argue that specific assets which are sold
because of liquidity constraints might not be redeployed to the buyers with the highest valuations because such
buyers might not have enough funds to finance the acquisition.
6Maksimovic and Phillips (2001, 2002) are an exception: they analyze allocation decisions by conglomerates
in an equilibrium context, but with no role for financial imperfections.
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are large it is easier for agents to profit from private information (Kyle, 1984; Holmstrom and
Tirole, 1993). Alternatively, large and active markets can absorb large trades with smaller
adverse price changes thus increasing potential gains from trade (Pagano, 1989). Our paper
points to an additional reason why an active external market for capital can be beneficial:
active markets help the economy overcome frictions introduced by the limited pledgeability of
cash flows, allowing capital to flow to the highest productivity users.
A recent theoretical paper that also analyzes the effect of institutional development (legal
protection) on the allocation of capital is Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002). Their focus is on
the allocation decision of investors, while the mechanism explored in this paper deals with the
allocation of capital among firms (our reallocation market for capital). In fact, our main results
stem from the bias for internal investment of mediocre firms and conglomerates, which is not
analyzed by Shleifer and Wolfenzon. It is this bias that generates the potential benefits of
external finance as well as the costs of internal capital markets, which are the novel results of
this paper. Perhaps most importantly for empirical purposes, these results suggest that, even
though lack of institutional development is crucial, it is not the only factor that influences the
efficiency of capital allocation. External finance and internal capital markets may also have
independent effects.
In the next section we characterize the effect of limited pledgeability in the equilibrium
allocation of capital, and analyze the effect of changes in the external financing requirements of
investment projects. As we show in section ??, this model can be easily extended to analyze the
effects of conglomeration and internal capital markets on the equilibrium allocation. Section ??
presents our final remarks. All the proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2 Limited pledgeability, external finance and the equilibrium
allocation of capital
In this section, we develop our theoretical framework to analyze the effect of institutional devel-
opment on the equilibrium allocation of capital. We then analyze how the equilibrium allocation
changes with firms’ external financing needs. In the model, entrepreneurs issue financial con-
tracts to raise the necessary capital to pay the investment cost of their projects at date t0.
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Information about the profitability of projects arrives at a later date t1. In light of the new in-
formation, capital can be reallocated among projects. The efficiency of this ‘reallocation market’
is the main object of our analysis.
In our set up, institutional development affects the fraction of cash flows that firms can pledge
to outside investors. Better institutions (e.g., laws that protect outsiders and regulators that
enforce these law) lead to higher pledgeability of cash flows. This limited pledgeability drives a
wedge between the true productivity of the projects and the ‘pledgeable return’, the return that
an entrepreneur can credibly commit to pay. We show that this wedge distorts the functioning
of the reallocation market in two important ways. First, some high productivity projects cannot
raise capital, and second, less productive projects are continued and their capital is not supplied
to more productive projects.
We then analyze the relation between external financing needs at date t0 and the efficiency
of the reallocation market at date t1. We vary the degree of date t0 external financing needs
by varying the initial wealth of entrepreneurs. To pay back investors, entrepreneurs enter con-
tracts that require liquidation at date t1. The higher the financing needs, the more frequently
projects need to be liquidated. For a firm in isolation, this increased liquidation is an inefficiency
brought about by external finance (as in Diamond, 1991). This result is consistent with most
of the corporate finance literature in that external finance introduces inefficiencies (Jensen and
Meckling, 1976, Myers, 1977, Myers and Majluf, 1984). However, once we embed these firms in
a market equilibrium framework in which capital allocation is already distorted, this ‘excessive’
liquidation can be socially beneficial because the capital released by liquidation can find its way
to higher productivity projects. Thus, even though it always introduces inefficiencies at the
firm level, external finance can be socially beneficial when its equilibrium effects are taken into
account.
2.1 The model
The timing of events is shown in Figure 1. There are three periods in the model, t0, t1, and
t2, and two types of agents. There is a set J with measure 1 of agents (‘entrepreneurs’), each
with one project opportunity (projects are described below) and a different set of agents with no
project opportunities (‘investors’). All agents are risk-neutral and do not discount the future.
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Figure 1: Timing of events
Thus, agents maximize their consumption in the final period (t2).
There is a single good in this economy (‘capital’). At date t0 the aggregate amount of capital
1 +K (with K > 1) is held by the two types of agents. Each entrepreneur has an endowment
of 1− Z units (with 0 ≤ Z < 1). The remaining K + Z is distributed among investors.
Technologies Capital can be stored with no depreciation from date t0 to date t1 and from
date t1 to date t2. In addition, capital can be invested in two types of technologies that pay off
in period t2.
The first technology (‘general technology’) is available to all agents in the economy at date
t1. We define x(ω) as the per-unit pay off of the general technology with ω being the aggregate
amount of capital invested in it.
Assumption 1 The general technology satisfies:
a. ∂[ωx(ω)]∂ω ≥ 0 c. x(1 +K) > 1
b. x′(ω) ≤ 0
We assume that total output is increasing in the amount invested in the general technology
(assumption ??(a)) but that the per-unit payoff is decreasing (assumption ??(b)). Assumption
??(c) guarantees that no capital is invested in storage at date t1 since the general technology
offers a higher return regardless of the amount invested in it.
We refer to the second type of technologies as projects. Each project is of infinitesimal size.
At date t0 a project requires an investment of one unit of capital. At date t1, a project can be
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liquidated, in which case the entire unit of capital is recovered.7 If a project is not liquidated, it
can receive additional capital or can simply be continued with no change until date t2. At date
t2, projects generate cash flows.
Projects have different productivities. Each project’s type, s, can take three values: H (high
productivity or ‘good’ projects), M (medium productivity or ‘medium’ projects), and L (low
productivity or ‘bad’ projects) with probabilities pH , pM , and pL (with pH + pM + pL = 1),
respectively. The projects’ type is not known at date t0 (not even to the entrepreneur who owns
it) but it is revealed to everyone in the economy at the beginning of date t1. The probability
distribution is independent across projects so that, at date t1, exactly a fraction pH , pM and pL
of the projects are of type H, M and L, respectively.
For simplicity, we assume drastic decreasing returns to scale. Each project generates YH ,
YM or YL (with YH > YM > YL ≡ 0) per unit invested when the project is good, medium, or
bad, respectively, but only for the first two units (i.e., the unit invested at t0 and the unit that
is potentially invested at t1). Additional units invested generate no cash flows. To rank the
productivity of the projects, we make the following assumption:
Assumption 2 YM > x(0)
The most productive technologies are good projects, followed by medium projects. By as-
sumption ??, medium projects are more productive than the general technology regardless of
the amount invested in the latter (since x(0) > x(ω) by assumption ??(b)). Finally, the bad
projects are the least productive.
Capital market at date t0 In the capital market at date t0, entrepreneurs raise Z from
outside investors in exchange for a set of promised payments. To focus on imperfections brought
about by limited pledgeability of payoffs (described below), we assume that initial contracts can
be made fully contingent on dates and type of project.
A contract offered by entrepreneur j is defined by a vector {qjs, Dj1s, Dj2s}s=L,H,M where qjs
7The only technology to transfer capital from date t0 to date t1 is storage. Since an investment in a project
can always be liquidated at date t1 and the entire unit recovered, there is no cost in starting a project at date t0.
Therefore, we assume that all projects are set up.
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is the probability that the project is liquidated, Dj1s is the payment to investor at date t1 when
the project is liquidated (since projects generate no cash flow at date t1, the payment D
j
1s can
be positive only when there is liquidation), and Dj2s is the payment to the investor at date t2.
Entrepreneurs approach investors and make them a take-it-or-leave-it offer.8 Since initial
investors can always store their capital from date t0 to date t1 and then invest it in the reallo-
cation market from date t1 to date t2, they accept the contract only if it offers them a payoff of
at least R∗Z, where R∗ is the expected return in the date t1 reallocation market. Entrepreneurs
maximize their payoff subject to the participation constraint of the investor.
Capital market at date t1 At date t1 the type of the project is realized and liquidation
occurs according to the specified probabilities in the contract. After liquidation occurs, date
t1 investors (investors that stored capital from date t0 to date t1, entrepreneurs, and date t0
investors of liquidated firms) allocate their capital to continuing projects and to the general
technology. The total amount of capital in the hands of date t1 investors is K + T , where T
is the capital released from liquidated projects. That is, T =
∫
j /∈C dj with C being the set of
projects that continue.
Each continuing project j announces P j , the amount it pays at date t2 for the first unit
of capital.9 Projects have no use for additional units of capital and thus offer to pay zero for
those units. Next, date t1 investors allocate their capital to either the projects or to the general
technology. An allocation in the capital market can be described by rj , the probability that
project j ∈ C gets capital and ω, the amount allocated to the general technology. An equilibrium
allocation must be consistent with date t1 investor maximization and satisfy the market clearing
condition
ω∗ +
∫
j∈C
rjdj = K + T. (1)
To maximize their payoff, date t1 investors start allocating capital to the technologies of-
fering the highest return and then allocate capital to technologies in decreasing order of the
offered return. When several projects offer the same return but there is not enough capital to
8The assumption that entrepreneurs have all the bargaining power can be justified by the fact that there is
excess supply of capital at date t0.
9This announcement depends on s, the realized productivity of the project. However, to lighten notation we
suppress it.
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allocate one unit to each project, any allocation rule is consistent with investor maximization
since investors are indifferent as to which technology receives capital. After describing limited
pledgeability, we specify an intuitively appealing rule for this case.
Limited pledgeability of cash flows We consider an imperfection at the firm level: firms
cannot pledge to outside investors the entire cash flow generated by projects. This limited
pledgeability assumption applies only to the date t2 cash flows but not to the date t1 liquidation
proceeds. That is, when liquidation takes place at date t1, the unit recovered is fully pledgeable:
Dj1s ≤ 1. (2)
However, the returns at date t2 are not. In particular, we assume that only a fraction λ of the
returns of the second unit invested is pledgeable.10 This imposes the additional constraint that
Dj2s ≤ λYs. (3)
Limited pledgeability also has implications for the price a firm can offer in the date t1 reallocation
market. When its realized productivity is s, a continuing project j can offer at most
P j ≤ P js ≡ λYs −Dj2s. (4)
The limited pledgeability assumption can be justified as being a consequence of lack of
institutional development, as shown in Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002). In their model, insiders
can expropriate outside investors, but expropriation has costs that limit the optimal amount of
expropriation that the insider undertakes. Higher levels of protection of outside investors (i.e.,
higher costs of expropriation) lead to lower expropriation and consequently higher pledgeability.
To justify the full pledgeability of cash flows in the case of liquidation, we could make the natural
assumption that liquidation proceeds are easier to verify than project returns.
Limited pledgeability also arises in other contracting frameworks. For example, limited
pledgeability is a consequence of the inalienability of human capital (Hart and Moore 1994).
Entrepreneurs cannot contractually commit never to leave the firm. This leaves open the possi-
bility that an entrepreneur could use the threat of withdrawing his human capital to renegotiate
10The assumption that the cash flows from the first unit are not pledgeable is made only for simplicity. It will
become clear our main results do not hinge on this assumption (see footnote ??)
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the agreed upon payments. If the entrepreneur’s human capital is essential to the project, he
will get a fraction of the date t2 cash flows.11 A natural assumption is that the entrepreneur’s
human capital is not needed to liquidate the firm. This justifies the fact that the entire liq-
uidation proceeds are pledgeable, but only a fraction of the date t2 cash flows are. Limited
pledgeability is also an implication of the Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) model of moral hazard
in project choice. In that model project choice cannot be specified contractually. As a result,
investors must leave a high enough fraction of the payoff to entrepreneurs to induce them to
choose the project with low private benefits but high potential profitability. Since liquidation
in our framework can be specified contractually, there is no need to leave anything to the en-
trepreneur when liquidation occurs. Again, this justifies the full pledgeability of liquidation
proceeds. Moreover, institutional development can also affect pledgeability in these alternative
contracting frameworks. For example, in the Holmstrom and Tirole framework we could model
institutional development as facilitating monitoring activities that reduce the size of private
benefits that insiders can extract.
Finally, we describe the allocation rule when several projects offer the same return, P , but
there is not sufficient capital to allocate one unit to each project. As we discussed above, any
allocation rule would be consistent with the maximization behavior of date t1 investors. We
assume a rule that favors firms with P js > P over those with P
j
s = P : capital is allocated first
to the former set of firms and only when each of them receives one unit does the other set of
firms receive capital. This rule reflects the fact that firms with P js > P can always outbid firms
with P js = P by offering to pay slightly above P if the allocation rule does not favor them.
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Thus, the allocation rule is a function r of both P j ’s and P j ’s.
11See Diamond and Rajan (2000, 2001) for another recent model which hinges on limited pledgeability of cash
flows arising from the Hart and Moore (1994) framework.
12This assumption is weak since, with the addition of a mild condition, all allocation rules yield similar equilibria.
The condition is that prices can be quoted in very small but discrete intervals δ > 0. Suppose, for instance, that
the allocation rule does not favor firms with P
j
s > P . In this case, firms with P
j
s > P would offer Nδ, with N
being the lowest integer such that Nδ > P while firms with P
j
s = P would offer (N − 1)δ. Thus, firms with
P
j
s > P would be guaranteed one unit and those with P
j
s = P would receive capital only after the demand from
the first set of firms has been satisfied. The rule we propose delivers a similar equilibrium, but is algebraically
simpler since it does not involve dealing with the additional constant δ.
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2.2 Illustration of the main effect
In this section we present an informal argument to illustrate the main mechanism of the model.
In the next section we formally characterize the equilibrium.
It is useful to think about the date t1 reallocation market in terms of demand and supply
of funds.13 On the supply side, there is a total of K + T to be allocated with T being the
capital from liquidated projects. This amount is determined by the contract that entrepreneurs
enter at date t0 to raise the necessary capital Z. Since continuation of low productivity projects
generates no cash, these projects are always liquidated. The liquidation proceeds are supplied
to the market since the entrepreneur has no use for them.14 As a result, aggregate liquidation
proceeds are at least pL (T ≥ pL). Figure 2 depicts the demand and supply schedules for two
different supply scenarios. The supply of capital (vertical line) in panel A is K + pL while total
supply in panel B is higher.
The demand for capital arises from good and medium projects and from the general tech-
nology. To raise capital at date t1, firms pledge part of the project’s date t2 cash flows. Due to
limited pledgeability, firms with high (medium) productivity projects can offer a maximum of
λYH (λYM ) per unit of capital (for the sake of the argument we assume that D2H = D2M = 0)
and the general technology offers x(ω). The aggregate demand schedule (the downward sloping
lines in panels A and B) shows the capital demanded for different levels of market return. If
we assume that x(ω) > λYH for low ω, as we do in Figure 2, some capital must be allocated
to the general technology before the projects get additional capital (the general technology can
initially offer a higher return than good and medium projects). As additional capital is allocated
to the general technology, the return it offers (the required return on capital) decreases. When
this return reaches λYH , good firms can start attracting capital. Additional capital is allocated
to good firms until they all get one unit. This explains the flat region of the aggregate demand.
The rest of the demand schedule is derived in a similar way.
13In this supply and demand framework the existence of an equilibrium is not guaranteed. In the formal
characterization of the equilibria, we model the date t1 capital market using the non-cooperative game described
above to guarantee the existence of an equilibrium. However, the intuition for both cases is very similar.
14Section ?? shows that when firms are composed of more than one project, it is possible to have T < pL
because some of the liquidation proceeds are allocated internally rather than being supplied to the market.
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In panel A, the market equilibrium rate is R∗ = x(K + pL). In this case, date t1 investors
allocate their capital to the general technology. Even though high productivity firms are the
best users of capital, they cannot attract any capital because the return in the market is higher
than the maximum return they can credibly offer (λYH < R∗).
Panel A assumes that the supply of funds is K + pL. That is, only low productivity projects
are liquidated. Notice that since good firms do not attract new capital in equilibrium, it would
be socially optimal to liquidate medium productivity projects and supply their capital to the
good projects. However, this reallocation does not happen voluntarily. Firms with medium
productivity projects generate cash flows of YM if they continue. If these projects are liquidated
and the unit recovered is invested in the market, they receive R∗ = x(K+pL). Since x(K+pL) <
YM , firms with medium productivity projects do not liquidate but rather continue.
In sum, limited pledgeability distorts capital allocation in two ways. First, good firms cannot
attract the capital that is available for allocation. And second, given that good firms cannot
pledge enough cash, firms with medium productivity projects choose not to liquidate and supply
their capital to the good firms.
How can firms with medium productivity projects be forced to liquidate their projects? As
we argue in detail in the next section, this is precisely the role of external finance at date t0.
If the initial financing requirement is high enough, the only way firms are able to repay initial
investors is by having some liquidation at date t1. Moreover, it is less costly to liquidate projects
of medium productivity than projects of high productivity. Thus, if liquidation is necessary for
initial financing, the optimal contract will require medium projects to be liquidated first.
This situation is depicted in Panel B. In this panel the supply of capital is higher than in
panel A (K + T > K + pL) because of increased date t0 financing requirements. In this case,
the additional capital drives down the market return on capital so that good firms attract some
funds. In other words, some of the capital from the liquidated medium projects finds its way to
the good projects, potentially improving the aggregate payoff.
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2.3 Characterization of the equilibrium
We solve the model backwards. Since at date t2 no decisions are taken, we start by describing
the equilibrium of the date t1 reallocation market for any possible subgame. After liquidation
has occurred, a subgame is defined by any set C of projects that continue and any arbitrary
contract for each of these projects. For a continuing project j with realized productivity s, the
relevant part of the contract is P js = λYs−Dj2s, the maximum that project j can offer. In what
follows we drop the subscript s.
Lemma 1 Given any set of projects C that continue and any contract for each j ∈ C, the
unique equilibrium in the date t1 reallocation market is as follows
• Define R∗ by:
x−1(R∗) +
∫
{j∈C|P j>R∗}
dj ≤ K + T ≤ x−1(R∗) +
∫
{j∈C|P j≥R∗}
dj (5)
where x−1 is the inverse of x, and x−1(R) = 0 for R ≥ x(0).
• The capital allocated to the general technology is ω∗ = x−1(R∗) > 0 and the allocation
function r satisfies
– r(P j , P j) = 1 if P j > R∗,
– r(P j , P j) = 0 if P j < R∗,
– r(P j , P j) = 1 if P j = R∗ and P j > R∗ and r(R∗, R∗) ∈ [0, 1] is chosen to satisfy the
market clearing condition in equation ??.15
• Entrepreneur j’s announcement is: P j = R∗ for P j ≥ R∗ and P j ∈ [0, P j ] otherwise.
Date t1 investors allocate capital to maximize their payoff. They start allocating capital to
the technologies offering the highest return and then allocate capital to technologies in decreasing
order of the offered return. As a result of this maximization behavior, there is a cutoff value R∗
such that all technologies offering more than R∗ get capital for sure and technologies offering
15We do not need to define r(R∗, P
j
) with R∗ > P
j
because R∗ is not a feasible announcement in this case.
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less than R∗ do not get capital. For projects, this rule implies that r = 1 if P j > R∗ and
r = 0 if P j < R∗. For the general technology this rule implies that ω∗ satisfies x(ω∗) = R∗.
For projects offering exactly R∗, investor maximization does not impose any constraint on how
capital is allocated among them. In case there is not sufficient capital to allocate one unit to
each of them, we use the rule specified above that gives priority to projects with P j > R∗. The
definition of R∗ guarantees that the market clears and that r(R∗, R∗) ∈ [0, 1].
When they are able to do so, entrepreneurs benefit from raising capital because, even when
they offer investors the maximum return possible, they keep a fraction (1 − λ)Ys > 0 of the
cash flows. An entrepreneur with P j > R∗ receives capital for sure for any announcement
P j ≥ R∗. Thus, it is optimal for him to offer only R∗. Entrepreneurs with P j = R∗ get
capital with probability r(R∗, R∗) ∈ [0, 1] when they announce R∗, do not get capital for a lower
announcement and, due to limited pledgeability, cannot offer more than R∗. Thus, the best they
can do is to offer R∗. Finally, entrepreneurs with P j < R∗ cannot raise capital with any feasible
announcement and so are indifferent with regard to all announcements.
We now solve for the contracts offered at date t0. We focus on symmetric equilibria in
which all entrepreneurs offer the same contract. We assume that all entrepreneurs offer con-
tract {qs, D1s, D2s}s=L,H,M and use Lemma ?? to find the equilibrium return and allocation
rule (R∗ and r) generated by the proposed contract. For these R∗ and r we find the best possi-
ble deviation {qjs, Dj1s, Dj2s}s=L,M,H by entrepreneur j and check that {qjs, Dj1s, Dj2s}s=L,M,H =
{qs, D1s, D2s}s=L,H,M . That is, that entrepreneur j has no incentives to deviate.
The best possible deviation by entrepreneur j, given R∗ and r, solves the following problem.
Since projects are of infinitesimal size, entrepreneur j′s contract does not affect the return R∗
or the function r. We let rjs ≡ r(P js , P js) where the announcement P js and the function r are
given in Lemma ??. Since we assume that entrepreneurs have all the bargaining power at date
t0, entrepreneur j’s optimal contract {qjs, Dj1s, Dj2s}s=L,M,H maximizes his payoff, U jE ,∑
sps
{
qjs(1−Dj1s)R∗ + (1− qjs)[Ys + rjs(Ys −Dj2s −R∗)]
}
(6)
subject to the date t0 investor’s payoff, U
j
I being at least his reservation payoff,∑
sps
{
qjsD
j
1sR
∗ + (1− qjs)rjsDj2s
}
≥ ZR∗. (7)
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When productivity is s, the project is liquidated with probability qjs. In this case the investor
receives Dj1s and the entrepreneur receives 1−Dj1s. They invest these amounts in the reallocation
market and earn a return of R∗. This explains the first term in equations ?? and ??. If the
project is not liquidated, the firm always generates cash flows of Ys. In addition, the firm
receives additional capital with probability rjs, generates Ys from that unit of capital and pays
Dj2s to the date t0 investors and R
∗ to the date t1 investor. D
j
2s is paid only when additional
capital is allocated to the firm since the payoff from the first unit of capital is not pledgeable
(by assumption). This explains the second term in equations ?? and ??. The reservation payoff
of the date t0 investor is ZR∗ since this investor can alternatively store his capital from date t0
to date t1 and then invest it in the reallocation market at a return of R∗.
We characterize the equilibrium contracts as a function of the degree of limited pledgeability
λ and the financing requirement Z. In the text, we focus on the most interesting cases, in
which the good projects are capital constrained (receive capital with probability less than 1).16
The remaining cases are described in the appendix. Since we consider symmetric equilibria,
the variable P j can take only three values depending on the realized productivity of project
s (P s ≡ λYs − D2s). The probability of receiving capital depends only on P j , thus it can
also take only three values depending on the realized productivity of the project. We let these
probabilities be rH , rM and rL.
Lemma 2 There is a function λ1(Z) such that the equilibrium contracts offered at date t0 are:
a. For Z ≤ pL, (qL, D1L, D2L) = (1, Z/pL, 0); (qM , D1M , D2M ) = (0, 0, 0); (qH , D1H , D2H) =
(0, 0, 0). That is, entrepreneurs liquidate their projects for sure when productivity is low
and do not liquidate their projects when productivity is medium or high. In this case,
T = pL.
b. For pL < Z ≤ pL + pM and λ ≤ λ1, (qL, D1L, D2L) = (1, 1, 0), (qM , D1M , D2M ) =
(Z−pLpM , 1, 0); (qH , D1H , D2H) = (0, 1, 0). That is, entrepreneurs liquidate their projects
for sure when productivity is low and also liquidate their projects with some probability
when productivity is medium. They never liquidate high productivity projects. In this case,
16We also assume an upper bound for the financing requirement, Z ≤ pL + pM . We discuss later what happens
for higher Z.
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T = Z.
By market clearing, ω∗ must satisfy 0 < ω∗ ≤ 1 +K. It follows that x(1 +K) ≤ R∗ < x(0)
and, by assumptions ?? and ??:17
YL ≡ 0 < R∗ < YM < YH . (8)
Clearly, the entrepreneur’s problem is equivalent to maximizing
U jE + U
j
I =
∑
sps
{
qjsR
∗ + (1− qjs)[Ys + rjs(Ys −R∗)]
}
subject to U jI = ZR
∗. This implies that the entrepreneur benefits from liquidating a low
productivity project, but loses if he liquidates either the medium or the high productivity project.
If the capital requirements are low, Z ≤ pL, then liquidation of the low productivity project is
sufficient to satisfy the participation constraint of the initial investor. This explains part a.18
However, if the capital requirements are high enough (Z > pL), liquidation of medium or
high productivity firms might be the only way to pay back the initial investor. Of course, a
more efficient way to compensate the initial investor is by paying him out of the date t2 payoff
(D2s > 0) since this avoids liquidation of H orM projects. However, this is not always possible.
When pledgeability is very low, firms cannot get capital in the reallocation market and, since
only the returns of the second unit are pledgeable, it is impossible to offer a fraction of the date
t2 payoffs. But the problem is more severe. The equilibrium has D2H = 0, even when type
H projects get capital in the reallocation market, as long as they get it with probability less
than 1. The lower is D2H (i.e., the higher is PH), the more likely a project is to raise capital
since it can offer a higher return in the reallocation market (see Lemma ??). If all the projects
were offering D2H > 0 and getting capital with probability less than one, a single firm would be
better off deviating and offering a contract with a slightly lower D2H (i.e., a slightly higher PH)
so as to be able to outbid all the other firms. Thus when good firms are constrained (rH < 1)
or equivalently when λ ≤ λ1, competition for capital at date t1 drives D2H to 0. By the same
logic, D2M = 0 in this range.
17An important inequality in what follows is R∗ < YM . As we explain in the text, this inequality follows from
the market clearing condition and assumption ??. However, this assumption is not necessary for the results. The
reason is that R∗ is increasing with λ (the simple demand and supply framework should convince the reader of
this). Thus, for low enough λ, we would still have R∗ < YM .
18Notice that part a) does not depend on λ being lower than λ1.
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Given that D2H and D2M are 0 in the range of λ considered, initial investors must be paid
out entirely out of date t1 liquidation proceeds. Liquidation of medium and high productivity
firms reduce the combined payoff. Thus, when liquidation occurs, the entire liquidation proceeds
should be given to the initial investors as this reduces the probability of liquidation. Since the
medium project is less productive, it is better to start liquidating it first. It is only when
liquidation of the low and medium productivity projects is not sufficient to satisfy the investor
participation constraint that the good projects start being liquidated. When Z ≤ pL + pM ,
liquidation of the low and medium productivity projects is sufficient to pay back the investor.19
Notice that qM is increasing in Z. The higher the financing requirement, the more frequent the
medium project needs to be liquidated.
All the other cases are described in the appendix. For λ > λ1, good projects can pledge a
sufficiently high return to receive capital with probability 1. Since good projects are no longer
capital constrained, there is no benefit in decreasingD2H to outbid other firms. Thus, it becomes
possible to sustain an equilibrium with D2H > 0. In fact it is optimal to have as large a D2H
as possible since by paying the investor at date t2, the entrepreneur avoids costly liquidation.
For even higher levels of λ, it is possible to sustain equilibria with D2M > 0. Finally, when the
degree of pledgeability is very large, the entrepreneur is able to pay the investor out of date t2
proceeds only.
Lemma ?? describes the equilibrium contract for each pair (λ, Z). Using these contracts in
Lemma ??, we obtain the equilibrium allocation rH and rM , and the equilibrium return in the
reallocation market R∗. Since for parts (a) and (b) of Lemma ??, D2s = 0, the contracts in
Lemma ?? imply that T = pL in case (a) and T = Z in case (b).
This is precisely the cases we showed in Figure 2. Panel A corresponds to case (a) of Lemma
?? with λYH < R∗ = x(K+pL). In this case all the capital is allocated to the general technology
since good projects cannot offer a sufficiently high return to attract capital. Thus, for low levels
of pledgeability, good projects do not get all the capital they demand and, at the same time,
medium projects are continued and their capital is not supplied to high productivity projects.
19When Z > pL + pM , some liquidation of the good project is necessary. In this case, we would have full
liquidation of medium projects (qM = 1) and partial liquidation of good projects (qH = (Z − pL − pM )/qM ) in
order to satisfy the financing requirement.
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That is, low pledgeability leads to a sub-optimal level of external market activity. Panel B
corresponds to case (b) Lemma ?? with x(K + Z) ≤ λYH < x(K + Z − pH). In this case,
λYH = R∗ and good firms are able to attract some capital. However, Z is not large enough to
allow all good firms to raise one unit of capital.
Finally, it is important to note that the potential benefits of an increase in external finance
are an externality to other firms. The firm that seeks outside finance does not benefit from
it, because the market does not compensate this firm for the capital that it releases to the
market. In this model, firms seek external finance only when they do not have sufficient funds
to invest. This effect can be seen in the entrepreneur’s maximization problem. Everything else
constant, his payoff is decreasing in qM . Therefore, introducing an outside investor that requires
liquidation when the firm is of medium productivity is sub-optimal for the firm.
2.4 Comparative Statics in λ and Z
We now analyze what happens to the aggregate payoff when pledgeability and the financing
requirements change. In the following proposition, the threshold λ1 is the same as in Lemma
??.
Proposition 1 The aggregate payoff
• is non-decreasing in the level of pledgeability, λ,
• for Z < pL, it is unaffected by the financing requirement Z,and
• for pL ≤ Z < pL+pM , there exists a λ0 < λ1 such that the aggregate payoff decreases with
Z for low λ (λ < λ0), increases with Z for intermediate levels of λ (λ0 ≤ λ < λ1), and
then decreases with (or is unaffected by) Z for high λ ( λ ≥ λ1).
Better pledgeability allows projects to raise capital more easily in the reallocation market.
Since this capital would have ended up invested in the general technology, an increase in pledge-
ability leads to higher aggregate output. This result is consistent with Wurgler’s (2000) finding
that better investor protection leads to a more efficient allocation of capital.
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For Z < pL, only bad projects are liquidated in equilibrium. In this range an increase in
the financing requirement does not affect qM or qH . Since the total amount of capital from
liquidation proceeds remains unchanged, aggregate output is not affected.
For Z ≥ pL, increases in the initial financing requirement make it necessary to liquidate
medium productivity projects more often. In case b) of Lemma ??, the aggregate amount
of liquidation is T = Z. Since the return of the medium project is higher than that of the
general technology, this liquidation creates a social inefficiency when the released capital ends
up invested in the general technology. This happens when pledgeability is low (λ < λ0) since
good firms are not able to offer a sufficiently high return to attract the released capital. If
pledgeability is higher (λ > λ0), good firms are able to attract some of the released capital,
increasing the aggregate payoff. At pledgeability levels above λ1, all good firms receive one unit
in the reallocation market and so an increase in liquidation of medium projects cannot raise
aggregate output.20 21
The reason higher financing requirements improve the reallocation of capital is that, because
of limited pledgeability, medium firms do not voluntarily liquidate their projects to invest in
high productivity firms unless forced by outside investors. Outside investors require liquidation
as this is the only way they can get their money back.22 Even though this forced liquidation by
outside investors is privately inefficient from the perspective of a medium firm, it is beneficial
20A similar result holds when Z > pL + pM . In such a case, either good firms are liquidated in equilibrium
(for lower λ), or they are not capital constrained (for higher λ). In order to see why, notice that if good firms
are capital constrained it must be that D2H = 0 in equilibrium, leaving no chance that initial investors will get
their money back without liquidation. But if Z > pL + pM , liquidation of bad and good firms is not enough, so
good firms must also be liquidated. Thus, if all good firms continue they cannot be capital constrained, leaving
no room for external finance to improve the allocation of capital.
21The fact that external finance cannot be beneficial when the pledgeability parameter is higher than λ1 is
driven by the fact that our model only has three types of technologies. When all the good firms receive one unit
of capital, further reallocation is not possible. With a continuum of productivities, external finance would always
allow capital to flow from lower to higher productivity firms. The potential benefit would only disappear when
all firms receive the efficient amount of capital.
22In the model we assume for simplicity that the cash-flows from the first unit cannot be pledged. Since medium
firms receive no additional capital, it is clear why an outside investor prefers to liquidate a medium firm rather
than to allow such a firm to continue until the final date. However, this result would hold more generally if we
allowed the first unit to be pledged. In order to see this, suppose that the same fraction λ of both units could be
pledged. In all possible equilibria at which good firms are capital constrained, the return on capital x would be
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for the economy because the additional capital supplied to the external market finds its way to
a better user.
Proposition ??makes it clear that external finance can only be beneficial when capital leaving
mediocre projects actually reaches high productivity projects. Thus, when pledgeability is very
low, the increase in liquidation of mediocre projects cannot improve the allocation of capital
because the external capital market can never materialize. Conversely, if pledgeability is large
enough, there is no need for external finance since good projects will attract capital anyway. On
the other hand, for intermediate levels of pledgeability, the reallocation market has the potential
to work well, but is constrained by the availability of funds to high productivity firms. For
this range of the pledgeability parameter, the increase in liquidation brought about by external
finance increases the efficiency of capital allocation.
These results are related to the literature on the benefits and costs of liquidation in an equi-
librium context. The ‘liquidationist’ view (Schumpeter, 1942, and De Long, 1990) is consistent
with our model when pledgeability is in a medium range (λ0 ≤ λ < λ1). In this case, the
liquidation of existing firms may be healthy for the economy because the released capital can be
used more productively for new projects. However, as in Caballero and Hammour (1996, 1998,
1999), liquidation might also be excessive if the released factors end up being unemployed. In
our model, this is the case when pledgeability is low (λ < λ0). Thus, both views are consistent
with our model for different degrees of institutional development.
Our results suggest that an increase in the external financing of firms in a given country
can improve measures of the efficiency of capital allocation (such as the measure suggested by
Wurgler, 2000). This result helps explain why countries where firms rely heavily on external
finance are also countries with high productivity and growth. The traditional explanation for
this correlation is that external finance allows firms to undertake investments over and above
the investments that could be financed with internal funds (Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic,
1998). The mechanism in our model suggests an alternative and complementary explanation: an
given by:
x(ω) ≥ λYH > λYM
Thus, since x(ω) > λYM it would still be true that outside investors strictly prefer to liquidate a medium firm
that cannot get additional capital in the external market.
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increase in external finance improves the flow of funds from lower to higher productivity projects,
because of the equilibrium effect of higher liquidation. Countries with large external capital
markets have high productivity and growth precisely because they do better at reallocating
capital across firms and projects in the economy.
3 Internal capital markets and the equilibrium allocation of cap-
ital
The last section shows how limited pledgeability distorts the capital allocation decision. High
productivity projects cannot get capital, while at the same time mediocre projects do not release
their capital to the external market. An increase in external financing requirements can mitigate
this misallocation of resources, but such an increase will not come about voluntarily because it
is privately inefficient for a firm in isolation.
One possible response of the economic system to these intrinsic limitations of external capital
markets is the creation of conglomerates. If conglomerates can reallocate capital internally from
bad to good projects, they can potentially improve the flow of capital in an economy. In
this section we extend the model of the previous section to analyze the effect of the degree of
conglomeration (the fraction of projects in conglomerates) on the efficiency of capital allocation.
Surprisingly, we find that an increase in conglomeration can be detrimental to the efficiency of
capital allocation even when conglomerates are assumed to allocate capital to their best projects.
This is because conglomerates, by reallocating capital among their divisions, reduce the supply
of capital to the external market.
Whether internal capital markets are efficient is still an open question (see Gertner, Scharf-
stein and Stein, 1994, Stein 1997, Fluck and Lynch, 1999, Maksimovic and Phillips, 2001, 2002,
and Matsusaka and Nanda, 2002 for arguments and evidence on efficient internal capital markets,
and Shin and Stulz, 1998, Rajan, Servaes and Zingales, 2000 and Scharfstein and Stein, 2000 for
evidence and arguments to the contrary).23 In fact, whether internal allocation of capital in a
conglomerate is privately efficient is not crucial for our arguments. Our assumption of efficient
internal reallocation only makes it more difficult to find a cost of conglomeration. As we explain
23For a survey of this literature, see Stein (2001).
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below, the feature of internal capital markets that drives our results is that conglomerates have
a preference for internal reallocation that is not always aligned with social optimality. In our
model, this preference is a direct consequence of limited pledgeability.
3.1 Introducing conglomerates and internal capital reallocation
We consider a simple extension of the model presented above. To focus on the conglomeration
effect, we abstract from initial financing and assume that at date t0 projects are already set up
(they all have one unit of capital invested, with no external claims). In the model, a conglomerate
is an organization with multiple projects in which a central authority (‘headquarters’) has control
rights over the allocation of capital. Other types of organizations, such as business groups, also
fit our definition of a conglomerate. We assume that there are no agency problems inside the
conglomerate.
We let c be the fraction of the projects that are part of conglomerates. The remaining fraction
of the projects are in single project firms (‘stand alone’ projects). We refer to c as the degree
of conglomeration in the economy. Further, we assume that each conglomerate is composed of
two projects. Thus, there are 1− c stand alone projects and c/2 conglomerates. After the type
of the projects is realized, there are six different types of conglomerates that we denote by (s, t)
where s, t = H,M,L refers to the productivity of the projects in the conglomerate.
In the date t1 reallocation market, stand alone projects announce the price they pay for the
first unit of capital (identical to the previous case). Conglomerates announce the price they
pay for the first unit and second unit. After the announcements, date t1 investors allocate their
capital.
After the date t1 reallocation market clears, conglomerates allocate their capital to their
different projects. If a conglomerate raises additional capital, it decides which project to allocate
it to. If it does not raise additional capital, a conglomerate can still take existing capital away
from one project and reallocate it to the other.
Regarding pledgeability, we maintain the assumption that the maximum an investor can get
from the date t2 cash flows of a project of type s is a fraction λ of the returns generated by
the additional units invested. Since there are no agency problems inside the conglomerate, a
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conglomerate of type (s, t) that raises one unit of capital allocates it to its best unit. Therefore,
in the reallocation market, this conglomerate can credibly pledge up to λmax{Ys, Yt} for the
first unit. This conglomerate can pledge up to λ(Ys + Yt)/2 per unit of capital when it raises
two units.
As in the previous section, we assume that when there are more offers at a price of P and
not enough capital for all of them, the allocation rule favors those conglomerates or firms that
could potentially offer more.
3.2 The main mechanism
In this section we explain the main mechanism driving the results. The next two sections
formalize this intuition. The most important result is that an increase in conglomeration may
decrease the efficiency of the economy-wide capital allocation even when conglomerates allocate
capital to their best projects.
We show that some conglomerates use only internal markets and do not participate in the
external capital market. Thus, an increase in the degree of conglomeration introduces a trade-off.
It reduces the number of transactions that take place in the external capital market, and increases
the number that take place in the various internal capital markets. Whether increasing the
degree of conglomeration is socially beneficial depends on which of these two markets (external
or internal) does a better job of allocating capital.
It would seem that, since conglomerates allocate capital to their best units whereas external
capital markets are plagued by pledgeability issues, it is always optimal to increase the degree of
conglomeration. However, this is not always the case. Conglomeration might hurt the efficiency
of capital allocation because the best project available to a conglomerate might not be the best
project available to the economy as a whole. In this case, increasing the number of conglomerates
exacerbates this capital allocation distortion. Conglomerate (M,L) always opts out of the
market and transfers capital from a project of type L to a project of typeM . This conglomerate
prefers this internal allocation over supplying its funds to the market regardless of whether there
are projects of type H in the market that do not receive capital. This is because, due to limited
pledgeability, a project of type H cannot offer a sufficiently large fraction of the returns to make
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it worthwhile for the conglomerate to supply its capital (we have shown that R∗ < YM ). If
instead these two projects were stand alone projects, the firm with a project of type L would
have no better alternative than to supply its capital to the market. If the degree of pledgeability
is not too low, this unit of capital will find its way to a project of type H. Therefore, as we
show more precisely in the next two sections, it is possible that an increase in conglomeration
will decrease the efficiency of economy-wide capital allocation.
3.3 Characterization of the equilibrium
We solve the model backwards. First, we analyze a conglomerate’s decision to allocate capital
after the reallocation market of date t1 has cleared. Since there are no agency conflicts inside
the conglomerate, headquarters allocate capital to maximize the conglomerate’s payoff. The
allocation rule inside the conglomerate is then as follows. A conglomerate that enters this stage
with two additional units of capital allocates one to each project. A conglomerate that enters
with only one unit allocates it to its higher productivity project. Finally, a conglomerate that
enters with no additional capital transfers one unit of capital from its existing lower productivity
project to its higher productivity project.
We now solve for the date t1 equilibrium announcements and allocation, using the results
from Section ??. In Lemma ??, the maximum a project j can offer in the reallocation market,
P
j
, is an important determinant of the equilibrium. This case is similar. A stand alone project
j with productivity s has P j = λYs (there are no contracts at date t0 so D
j
2s = 0). If project j
is in a conglomerate, it is the conglomerate and not the individual project that promises cash
flows to investors. However, with a suitable definition of P j that incorporates the information
that project j is in a conglomerate, we are able to solve the equilibrium as if all projects were
stand alones. This simplifies the analysis since we can directly use the results of Section ??.
A conglomerate allocates the first unit of additional capital to its higher productivity project.
Thus, for project j of type s that is in a conglomerate (s, t) with Ys > Yt, we define P
j = λYs.
The same conglomerate (s, t) can offer a maximum of λ(Ys + Yt)/2 per unit when it raises two
units of capital. Therefore for project j of type s in a conglomerate (s, t) with Ys ≤ Yt, we define
P
j = λ(Ys + Yt)/2.
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We apply this rule to all types of conglomerates and stand alones. As explained in Section
??, YL < R∗ < YM < YH . Thus, conglomerates of type (H,H), (M,M) and (H,M), and stand
alone projects of type H and M do not liquidate, but rather demand funds from the market.
Given the above discussion, a project j of productivity s in a conglomerate (s, s) has P j = λYs
and project j of type H in a conglomerate (H,M) has P j = λYH . That is, these projects can
offer the same return as a stand alone of the same productivity, and thus, in equilibrium, receive
capital with the same probability. However, project j of productivity M in a conglomerate
(H,M) has P j = λ(YH + YM )/2 > λYM . This project can offer more than a stand alone of
type M since the conglomerate can use some of the cash flows from the type H project to raise
capital for the type M project.24 As a result, project M in a conglomerate (H,M) receives
capital before any other project of type M .
A key difference between this model and that described in Section ?? is that not all firms
participate in the market. In particular conglomerates (H,L) and (M,L) are (weakly) better off
allocating capital internally than participating in the external capital market. This is because
the best they can do in the market is to supply the unit of capital in their low productivity
project and raise one unit for their higher productivity one. But, they do not need the market
to accomplish this transaction. Furthermore, if the probability of raising capital in the external
market is less than one, they strictly prefer internal reallocation.
Since YL = 0 < R∗, conglomerates (L,L) and all the stand alone projects L liquidate and
supply their capital to the market. There are a number (1 − c)pL of stand alone projects of
productivity L and a number c2(pL)
2 of conglomerates (L,L), each with two units of capital.
The additional supply to the external capital market is then
T = (1− c)pL + cp2L.
When the degree is conglomeration is positive, c > 0, the additional capital supplied to the
market from existing firms is lower than pL (T < pL). Recall that in Section ??, the amount of
additional capital in the external market from existing projects was at least pL since all projects
with productivity L supplied their capital to the market. With external finance it was possible
24The conglomerate is thus relaxing the project M’s external financing constraint. This effect is what Stein
(2001) calls the “more money” effect of conglomeration. Fluck and Lynch (1999) and Inderst and Mueller (2002)
also have models that feature a similar “more money” effect.
27
that T > pL. With a positive degree of conglomeration, the opposite occurs. Conglomerates
(H,L) and (M,L) opt out of the market because they prefer to allocate capital internally. As a
result, not all the capital in type L projects is supplied to the external market. The higher the
degree of conglomeration, the higher the number of projects that opt out of the market, and the
smaller the amount of capital supplied.
Based on the discussion above, P j takes only three values: λYH , λ(YH + YM )/2, and λYM .
Projects with the same P j offer the same price in the reallocation market and hence receive
capital with the same probability. We define rH , rHM , and rM as the probabilities that projects
with P j of λYH , λ(YH + YM )/2, and λYM receive capital, respectively. Applying Lemma ??,
with C being the set of projects that continue and participate in the market, the equilibrium
rH , rHM , and rM can be obtained (these expressions are derived in the appendix).
3.4 Aggregate payoff and conglomeration
The aggregate payoff in the economy, Π, can be written as:
Π = ωx(ω) + (1− c) [pH(YH + rHYH) + pM (YM + rMYM )]+
c
2
 p2H(2)(YH + rHYH) + p2M (2)(YM + rMYM ) + 2pHpM (2YH + rHYM + rHMYM )
+2pHpL(2YH) + 2pMpL(2YM )

where:
ω = K + (1− c)pL + cp2L − rH(pH − cpLpH)− rHM (cpHpM )− rM ((1− c)pM + cp2M )
The first term is the cash flow generated by the general technology. The second term is the
cash flow generated by the stand alone projects. Each stand alone project of type s generates
Ys, and with probability rs receives one additional unit of capital that generates an additional
Ys. The third term is the cash flow generated by conglomerates. Each term inside the bracket is
the cash flow generated by a type of conglomerate. The first term is the cash flow generated by
conglomerates of type (H,H). Out of a number c/2 of conglomerates, a fraction p2H are of type
(H,H). Since, as explained above, each of its two projects receive capital with probability rH , it
generates 2(YH +rHYH). The next term is the cash flow generated by the (M,M) conglomerate
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and is derived similarly. The third term inside the brackets is the cash flow generated by the
fraction 2pMpH of conglomerates of type (H,M). When pledgeability is very low, a conglomerate
(H,M) receives no capital. In this case, it transfers its existing unit in the type M project to
the type H project and generates cash flows of 2YH . For higher levels of pledgeability, this
conglomerate receives one unit of capital with probability rH . When it receives this unit, it
allocates it to the H project and keeps the existing unit in the type M project to generate
2YH + YM . Finally, for even higher levels of pledgeability, the conglomerate receives one unit
for sure (rH = 1) and receives a second unit with probability rHM . When it receives two units,
it generates 2YH + 2YM . The expected cash flow generated by this type of conglomerate is
then 2YH + rHYM + rHMYM . Finally, the last two terms inside the brackets are the cash flows
generated by conglomerates (H,L) and (M,L). These conglomerates never participate in the
market. They simply transfer the existing unit of capital from their type L project to their
higher productivity project.
Since we have derived expressions for rH , rHM , and rM , we can find the effect of the degree
of conglomeration in the aggregate payoff by differentiating Π with respect to c.
Proposition 2 There are functions λ̂1(c) < λ̂2(c) such that:25
a. For λ < λ̂1(c), the aggregate payoff is increasing in the degree of conglomeration,
b. For λ̂1(c) < λ < λ̂2(c), the aggregate payoff is decreasing in the degree of conglomeration,
and
c. For λ > λ̂2(c), the aggregate payoff is non-decreasing in the degree of conglomeration.
For low levels of pledgeability, the external market does a poor job of allocating capital.
Since conglomerates allocate capital to their best units irrespective of the level of pledgeability,
a higher degree of conglomeration increases the number of efficient capital transfers that take
place in the economy, thereby increasing the aggregate payoff. This explains part (a).
In region (b) the market does a better job of allocating capital than in region (a). In
particular, the functions λ̂1 and λ̂2 are chosen such that, in this region, rH is large but less
25This derivative does not exist at λ = λ̂1 and λ = λ̂2.
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than 1. The reason why conglomeration is detrimental to the aggregate payoff is that the best
project available to a conglomerate might not be the best project available to the economy as
a whole. Therefore, increasing the number of conglomerates exacerbates the existing distortion
in capital allocation. In particular, conglomerates of type (M,L) always opt out of the market.
These conglomerates allocate the capital from their type L project to their type M project.
However, if instead these projects were stand alone projects, the capital in the type L project
would be supplied to the market. Since in this range of pledgeability the external capital market
works relatively well, these units of capital would find their way to type H projects, thereby
increasing the aggregate payoff. This reasoning does not apply to case (a). In this case, due to
low pledgeability, external capital markets do a poor job of allocating capital and therefore, if
the conglomerates were separated, the unit released would not find its way to a good project.
As in Section ??, the bias towards internal investment is due to limited pledgeability. A
conglomerate of type (M,L) does not supply capital to the market but rather allocates it inter-
nally (even when there is unsatisfied demand from projects of type H), since projects of type
H cannot offer a sufficiently high return. In this range, the maximum return a type H project
can offer is lower than the cash flows a project of type M generates (i.e., λYH < YM ) and thus
it is privately optimal for the conglomerate to allocate internally whereas it is socially optimal
to supply its capital to the market.
Finally, for higher levels of pledgeability, increasing conglomeration is never detrimental to
the aggregate payoff. This is because for high levels of pledgeability, all the projects of type
H receive capital in the external capital market (rH = 1). As a result, transfers that take
place inside the (M,L) conglomerates are no longer suboptimal since the best project in need
of capital for the economy as a whole is now project M .
In sum, for intermediate levels of pledgeability, an increase in conglomeration worsens capital
allocation by further reducing external market activity.
3.5 Business groups and the allocation of capital
Although we did not explicitly discuss it, in our model firms have private incentives to con-
glomerate since, by creating an internal capital market, project-owners increase the probability
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of receiving capital. Furthermore, this incentive is higher when the external market works
poorly, or equivalently, when pledgeability is low. This result is consistent with the evidence
on business groups. These organizations, which are prevalent in developing countries where in-
vestor protection is typically poor, have internal capital markets (Leff 1976, Khanna and Palepu
1997). Claessens, Djankov, Fan, and Lang (2000) find that 68 percent of listed firms in 9 Asian
economies belong to business groups. The listed companies of a single group in India, the Tata
group, accounts for approximately 8% of the country’s public companies (Khanna and Palepu,
1997).26 27
The novel implications of our model regard the effect of conglomeration on the efficiency of
economy-wide capital allocation. Conglomerates impose a negative externality to other firms
because internal reallocation dries up the external market and makes it more difficult for good
projects to raise funds. The large size of business groups suggest that their potential for reducing
the depth of the external capital market can be a first order effect.
Even if we assume that conglomerates allocate capital to their best units, we show that this
negative externality can be sufficiently strong to outweigh the benefits of efficient internal capital
markets. This is the case when investor protection is in an intermediate range. In this range,
the external capital market has the potential to work well when sufficient capital is supplied.
Therefore, an increase in conglomeration, by drying up the external market, can have a large
negative effect on capital allocation. However, when investor protection is low, regardless of
the amount of capital supplied, the external market never materializes. As a result, the degree
of conglomeration has no impact on the efficiency of external reallocation. In this range, the
benefits of efficient internal capital markets dominate the negative externality.
These results shed light on a recent debate about whether business groups should be dis-
mantled (Khanna and Palepu 1999). An argument against dismantling business groups is that
their internal capital markets provide a substitute for the lack of external capital markets. The
26Hubbard and Palia (1999) argue that even in the U.S. the merger wave of the 1960s was motivated by a desire
to overcome the absence of well-developed capital markets at that time. However, it should be mentioned that
Matsusaka (1993) offers a technological interpretation for the merger wave of the 1960s (managerial synergies).
27Stein (1997) also conjectures that in countries where external markets are underdeveloped, conglomerates are
likely to be socially optimal because it is more important to ensure that the limited funds available are efficiently
reallocated across projects.
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results in this section show that, even when conglomerates allocate capital to their best units,
their presence can hurt economy wide capital allocation by reducing external market activity.
This result might help explain why governments may need to take an active role in dismantling
conglomerates. Individual conglomerates have no incentives to dismantle since they would not
be properly compensated by the capital they provide to the external market.
We should note that other models also have the implication that, as the financing-related
benefits of conglomeration decrease, costs of conglomeration such as less effective monitoring
(Stein, 1997), coordination costs (Fluck and Lynch, 1999) and free cash-flow problems (Mat-
susaka and Nanda, 2002) make conglomerates less desirable. However, our model is novel in two
ways.
First, most of the literature focuses on conglomerates in isolation and thus is unable to
analyze the effect of conglomeration on economy-wide capital allocation.28 More importantly, an
implication of our main result is that it is not possible to extrapolate results about the efficiency
of capital allocation from models of conglomerates in isolation. In our set up conglomerates are
assumed to allocate capital efficiently. Yet, for intermediate levels of pledgeability, increases in
conglomeration actually hurt economy-wide capital allocation.
Second, our model predicts that the (social) costs of conglomeration are the highest when
the underlying imperfection (cash-flow pledgeability) is at an intermediate range. Other models,
such as Stein (1997) and Fluck and Lynch (1999), imply a monotonic relationship between the
underlying imperfection and the benefits of conglomeration. The novel empirical implication is
that conglomeration is more costly for countries whose institutions are in a process of develop-
ment, and not necessarily for countries with very well developed capital markets such as the US
in the 1990s.
28Maksimovic and Phillips (2001, 2002) are an exception. They analyze the allocation of resources by conglom-
erates in an equilibrium context. However, their model is based on differences in managerial and organizational
abilities (as in Matsusaka, 2001), with no role for financial market imperfections.
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4 Conclusion
We analyze the allocation of capital to investment projects in an equilibrium context. This
allocation is affected by an imperfection at the firm level: due to poor institutional development
and investor protection, project-owners can only pledge a fraction of the returns generated by
the additional investment. As a result, the productivity of projects is higher than the return
project-owners can pledge to outsiders. This wedge distorts the flow of capital across projects
and firms in the economy. Firms may not be able to raise finance for their good projects. At the
same time, rather than supply their capital to the market, other firms fail to liquidate mediocre
projects. Moreover, conglomerates allocate additional resources to their mediocre projects. That
is, lack of institutional development reduces external market activity by biasing firms’ decisions
towards internal investment.
Stimulating external market activity can improve the allocation of capital. In this paper,
we study two scenarios: the need for external finance and deconglomeration. External finance
increases the supply of capital in the reallocation market because external investors liquidate
projects too often. Conglomeration affects the supply of capital because of the possibility of
internal reallocation.
The benefits of external finance and deconglomeration come about because they increase
activity in the external capital market, and improve its allocative role. Interestingly, these
benefits occur even though external finance and deconglomeration are always privately inefficient.
We show in the paper that whether these social benefits dominate private costs depends on
the degree of pledgeability. When pledgeability is too low, the costs dominate the benefits.
Pledgeability is one variable which will be related to the efficiency of reallocation, but in general
any variables which affect reallocation will have a similar effect. This suggests the following
conjectures.
The ease of reallocating capital is correlated with the flexibility of the market for corporate
assets (mergers, divestitures, etc.). In countries where these markets are large, active and
relatively flexible, it is more likely that external finance and deconglomeration will have the
kinds of benefits that we are describing here. Having more external finance, for example, may
force firms to either acquire more assets or to divest, and this may lead to an improvement in
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the allocation of resources.
The increase in activity in external capital markets that generates our results can also be
generated by “short-term” outside investors. Firms would never voluntarily choose to be short-
termist, since this would bias decisions against long term projects. However, short-termism
might be socially beneficial because it might force firms to liquidate investments instead of
betting on a long term project. This might improve the efficiency of the reallocation market
because it increases the supply of funds to be reallocated, and may in fact lead to a higher social
payoff.
Our results also have implications for the literature on the boundaries of the firm. Bolton and
Scharfstein (1998) and Stein (2001) have recently argued for a “capital-allocation-centric” view of
the theory of the firm. Their argument is that a collection of assets (such as our projects) should
reside under a single roof if internal capital markets do a better job of allocating capital to these
projects than does the external capital market. Our model suggests that such privately optimal
boundaries might not be socially efficient once we embed assets and firms in an equilibrium
model of capital allocation.
On a more abstract level, our paper shows the need to model financial imperfections in
an equilibrium framework in order to derive positive and normative implications about overall
economic efficiency because the intuition obtained from partial equilibrium models does not
always apply directly. Our results that the need for external finance might be beneficial and
that the presence of efficient conglomerates might be detrimental to capital allocation go against
the intuition obtained from partial equilibrium models.
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5 Appendix
Proof of Lemma ??
Suppose any cutoff R∗. For P
j ≥ R∗, we can rule out all announcements except P j = R∗. First, if P j > R∗,
then P j > R∗ is not an equilibrium announcement because the entrepreneur is better off offering P j − ² > R∗
and still receiving one unit of capital (recall that the allocation rule is r = 1 if P j > R∗). For P
j
= R∗, P j > R∗
is not feasible. Second, P j < R∗ is not an equilibrium announcement either because the entrepreneur gets no
capital for sure whereas by offering P j = R∗ he gets capital with positive probability (in general). For P
j ≤ R∗,
the announcement is irrelevant. This proves that if the equilibrium exists, it is unique.
The only way that P j = R∗ for firms with P
j ≥ R∗ is an equilibrium is if rj = 1 for P j > R∗. If this were not
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true, i.e., rj < 1 for P
j
> R∗, then any firm with P
j
> R∗will benefit by deviating from P j = R∗ to P j = R∗ + ²
with ² > 0 very small. This deviation increases the probability of getting capital from r to 1 and only increases
the offer price by ². Since ² can be made arbitrarily small, this is a profitable deviation.
Finally, equation ?? guarantees that R∗ is set so as to satisfy rj = 1 for P
j
> R∗ and market clearing.
We state the following Lemma that covers all cases for Z < pL + pM . The version of Lemma ?? described in
the main text is a special case.
Lemma 2 There are functions λk(Z) for k = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 such that equilibrium contracts offered by entrepreneurs
at date t0 are:
a. For Z ≤ pL, (qL, D1L, D2L) = (1, Z/pL, 0); (qM , D1M , D2M ) = (0, 0, 0); (qH , D1H , D2H) = (0, 0, 0)
b. For pL < Z ≤ pL + pH YHYM − pH , (qL, D1L, D2L) = (1, 1, 0), D1M = D1H = 1, qH = 0 and
1. For λ ≤ λ1, qM = Z−pLpM , D2M = D2H = 0
2. For λ1 < λ ≤ λ2, qM = Z−
pHD2H
R̂
−pL
pM
, D2M = 0, and D2H = λYH − R̂, where R̂ is defined by
x(K + Z − λYH
R̂
pH) = R̂
3. For λ2 < λ, qM = 0, D2M = 0, D2H =
R̂(Z−pL)
pH
, where
R̂ =

x(K + pL − pH) if λYM < x(K + pL − pH)
λYM if x(K + pL − pH) ≤ λYM ≤ x(K + pL − pH − pM )
x(K + pL − pH − pM ) if λYM > x(K + pL − pH − pM )
c. For pL + pH
YH
YM
< Z ≤ pL + pM , (qL, D1L, D2L) = (1, 1, 0), D1M = D1H = 1, qH = 0 and
1. For λ ≤ λ1, the contract is identical to that in case b.1
2. For λ1 < λ ≤ λ3, the contract is identical to that in case b.2
3. For λ3 < λ ≤ λ4, qM = Z−
pHD2H
R̂
−pL
pM
, D2M = 0, and D2H = λYH − R̂, where R̂ = λYM
4. For λ4 < λ ≤ λ5, qM = Z−
λ
R̂
(pHYH+pMYM )−pL+pM+pH
pM (2− λR̂YM )
, D2M = λYM − R̂, and D2H = λYH − R̂,
where R̂ satisfies x(K + 2(pL + pMqM (R̂))− 1) = R̂
5. For λ > λ5, qM = 0, and D2M and D2H can be anything that satisfies pMD2M +pHD2H+pLR̂ = ZR̂
and D2s ≤ λYs − R̂ where R̂ is defined by R̂ = x(K + pL − pH − pM )
Proof
In the proof, as in the text, variables with superscript j denote the optimal level from the maximization
problem (equation ?? subject to equation ??), whereas variables with no superscript j denote proposed equilibrium
variables. We rewrite the maximization problem for ease of reference. Entrepreneur j maximized his payoff
U jE =
∑
sps
{
qjs(1−Dj1s)R∗ + (1− qjs)[Ys + rjs(Ys −Dj2s −R∗)]
}
(9)
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subject to the participation constraint of the date t0 investor
U jI =
∑
sps
{
qjsD
j
1sR
∗ + (1− qjs)rjsDj2s
}
≥ ZR∗ (10)
We define λ1 ≡ x(K +Z − pH)/YH , λ2 ≡ x(K+pL−pH )YH

1 + Z−pL
pH
, λ3 ≡
x(K+Z−pH YHYM )
YM
, λ4 ≡ x(K + 2(Z −
pHYH
YM
+ pH)− 1)/YM and λ5 ≡ Z−pL+pH+pMpHYH+pMYM x(K + pL − pM − pH).
Step 1:
∂U
j
E
∂q
j
L
≥ 0 (with equality only when Dj1L = 1),
∂U
j
E
∂q
j
s
< 0 (for s = H,M) and U jE is weakly decreasing in
Dj2s (for s = H,M, and it is strictly decreasing when q
j
s < 1 and r
j
s > 0)
P
j
L = 0 by equations ?? and ??. Thus P
j
L < R
∗ and, by Lemma ??, rjL = 0. Now,
∂U
j
E
∂q
j
L
= (1−Dj1L)R∗ ≥ 0.
Also, for s = H,M , Ys > R
∗ and thus
∂U
j
E
∂q
j
s
= (1 −Dj1s)R∗ − [Ys + rjs(Ys −Dj2s − R∗)] < 0. Finally, an increase
in Dj2s for s = H,M has two effects on U
j
E . The direct effect weakly decreases U
j
E . The indirect effect works by
weakly decreasing rjs (because P
j
s = λYs −Dj2s decreases and, by Lemma ??, rjs weakly decreases), which in turn
weakly decreases U jE .
Step 2 (Proof of part a): If Z ≤ pL then (qjL, Dj1L, Dj2L) = (1, Z/pL, 0) and (qjM , Dj1M , Dj2M ) = (qjH , Dj1H , Dj2H) =
(0, 0, 0)
From step 1, every entrepreneur maximizes the objective function by setting qjL = 1, q
j
M = q
j
H = 0 and
Dj2M = D
j
2H = 0. Since q
j
M = q
j
H = 0, D
j
1M and D
j
1H are irrelevant (we set them to zero). Also, since q
j
L = 1,
Dj2L is irrelevant (we set it to zero). Finally since q
j
L = 1, D
j
1L = Z/pL the participation constraint is satisfied.
Therefore, the above is the optimal contract for every entrepreneur j.
We now consider the cases where pL < Z ≤ pL + pM .
Step 3: For Z > pL, then (q
j
L, D
j
1L, D
j
2L) = (1, 1, 0) and D
j
1M = D
j
1H = 1.
Since Z > pL, then by the participation constraint, it must be that max{qjMDj1M , qjHDj1H , (1−qjM )rjMDj2M , (1−
qjH)r
j
HD
j
2H} > 0. First, we show that qjL = 1. Suppose not, i.e., qjL < 1. If Dj1L < 1 then an increase in qjL increases
U jE while not violating the participation constraint (U
j
I is also increasing in q
j
L). Contradiction. If D
j
1L = 1 an
increase in qjL increases U
j
I , relaxing the participation constraint (U
j
I > ZR
∗). Since Z > pL, at least one of
the following holds: qjsD
j
1s > 0 ( s = H,M) or (1 − qjs)rjsDj2s > 0 (s = H,M). If the first case holds, then a
slight decrease in qjs increases U
j
E without violating the constraint. Contradiction. If the second case holds, then
a slight decrease in Dj2s increases U
j
E (since it must be that q
j
s < 1 and r
j
s > 0) without violating the constraint.
Contradiction.
Now we prove that Dj1L = 1. Suppose not, i.e., D
j
1L < 1. Consider an increase in D
j
1L to D
j
1L + ² with ² > 0.
Again, since Z > pL, at least one of the following holds: q
j
sD
j
1s > 0 ( s = H,M) or (1− qjs)rjsDj2s > 0 (s = H,M).
Suppose the first case holds. Since qjs > 0, it must be that U
j
I is increasing in q
j
s or D
j
1sR
∗ > rjsD
j
2s (otherwise
setting qjs = 0 would increase the objective function and relax the constraint). Entrepreneur j can decrease q
j
s
to qjs − δ where δ = ² pLR
∗
ps(D
j
1sR
∗−rjsDj2s)
is chosen so as to leave the participation constraint unchanged. Note that
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δ > 0 since Dj1sR
∗ > rjsD
j
2s. The change in the objective function is given by: δps(Ys + r
j
s(Ys − R∗) − R∗) > 0.
Contradiction. If the second case holds, a similar procedure shows a contradiction.
Next we show that Dj1s = 1 for s = M,H. First, if q
j
s = 0 then D
j
1s is irrelevant (we set it to 1). Suppose
that qjs > 0 and D
j
1s < 1. As before, since q
j
s > 0, D
j
1sR
∗ > rjsD
j
2s. An entrepreneur can increase D
j
1s to D
j
1s + ²
and decrease qjs to q
j
s − δ where δ = ² q
j
sR
∗
D
j
1sR
∗−rjsDj2s+²R∗
> 0 is chosen so as to leave the participation constraint
unchanged. The change in the objective function is δps(Ys + r
j
s(Ys −R∗)−R∗) > 0. Contradiction.
We only need to find qjM , q
j
H , D
j
2M and D
j
2H to complete the characterization of the contract. We first show
a preliminary and intuitive result that firms of type M are liquidated before firms of type H:
Step 4: If rjMD
j
2M ≤ rjHDj2H and rjM ≤ rjH then qjH > 0 implies qjM = 1.29 This, together with Z ≤ pL + pM ,
implies that qH = 0.
Suppose not, i.e., rjMD
j
2M ≤ rjHDj2H , rjM ≤ rjH , qjH > 0 and qjM < 1. Entrepreneur j can deviate by increasing
qjM to q
j
M = q
j
M + ² and decreasing q
j
H to q
j
H = q
j
H − δ with δ = ²
pM (R
∗−rj
M
D2M )
pH (R
∗−rj
H
D2H)
. The choice of δ guarantees
that the participation constraint is unchanged. rjMD
j
2M ≤ rjHDj2H implies that pHδ ≥ pM ². The change in the
objective function is given by pHδ(1 + r
j
H)(YH − R∗)− pM ²(1 + rjM )(YM − R∗) > 0. The inequality follows from
YH −R∗ > YM −R∗ > 0 (by equation ??), rH ≥ rM and pHδ ≥ pM ². Contradiction. This step implies that firm
of type M is liquidated first and only then is a firm of type H liquidated. Since Z ≤ pL + pM , then qH = 0.
In what follows, the conditions of step 4 always hold so qjH = 0. With all these preliminary results we are
ready to prove the different cases of the Lemma. But first, we describe the equilibrium R∗, rH and rM . The
following table is derived assuming that PH ≥ PM (which will always be the case) and uses equations ?? and ??.
Case Range R∗ rH rM
1 x(K + T ) > PH x(K + T ) 0 0
2 x(K + T ) ≤ PH ≤ x(K + T − pH) PH K+T−x
−1(PH )
pH
0
3
PH > x(K + T − pH) and
PM < x(K + T − pH)
x(K + T − pH) 1 0
4 x(K + T − pH) ≤ PM ≤ x(K + T − pH − pM ) PM 1 K+T−pH−x
−1(PM )
pM
5 PM > x(K + T − pH − pM ) x(K + T − pH − pM ) 1 1
Table 1: R∗, rH and rM as a function of T, PH and PM .
Step 5 (proof of part b.1 and c.1): For pL < Z ≤ pL + pM and λ ≤ λ1 the equilibrium contract has
(qM , D2M ) = (
Z−pL
pM
, 0) and (qH , D2H) = (0, 0).
29It can be shown that in any equilirbium rMD2M ≤ rHD2H and rjM ≤ rjH . Thus, qH > 0 always implies
qM = 1. However, for the rest of the proof, this less general result is sufficient.
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First, we find the equilibrium given the contracts. Assuming all entrepreneurs offers the same contract, total
liquidation is T = pL + qMpM + qHpH = Z. Also PH = λYH and PM = λYM . Now λ ≤ λ1 is equivalent to
λYH ≤ x(K + Z − pH). By Table 1, R∗ ≥ λYH .
Second, assuming every entrepreneur is offering the proposed contract we solve for entrepreneur’s j optimal
deviation (by maximizing equation ?? subject to equation ??). Setting Dj2H > 0 is not optimal. It guarantees that
rjH = 0 and so it does not increase the payoff nor does it relax the participation constraint. Similarly, D
j
2M > 0
is not optimal. Finally, by the participation constraint qjM =
Z−pL
pM
. Since (qjs, D
j
2s)s=H,M = (qs, D2s)s=H,M , we
have, in fact, an equilibrium.
Step 6 (proof of part b.2 and c.2): For λ1 < λ ≤ min{λ2, λ3} (this region is non-empty), every entrepreneur
sets (qM , D2M ) = (
Z− pHD2H
R̂
−pL
pM
, 0) and (qH , D2H) = (0, λYH − R̂), where the market return R̂ is the solution to
x(K + Z − λYH
R̂
pH) = R̂.
First, we compute the equilibrium R∗ given the contracts. Total liquidation is given by T = pL + pMqM =
Z − pHD2H
R̂
= Z − pHλYH
R̂
+ pH . Since PH = λYH − D2H = R̂ = x(K + Z − λYH
R̂
pH) = x(K + T − pH),this
case always falls under case 2 of Table 1 . Thus rM = 0 and rH =
K+T−x−1(PH )
pH
= K+T−(K+T−pH )
pH
= 1. Also,
according to Table 1, R∗ = PH = R̂. The other two variables of interest can be written now as
D2H = λYH −R∗ (11)
and,
T = Z − pHD2H
R∗
(12)
To analyze the properties of R∗, we define
F (R, λ) = x(K + Z − λYH
R
pH)−R. (13)
For any λ, the equilibrium R∗(λ) satisfies F (R∗(λ), λ) = 0. Next, by the implicit function theorem, ∂R
∗
∂λ
= − Fλ
FR
>
0. This implies, by equation ?? that ∂T
∂λ
< 0 and consequently ∂qM
∂λ
< 0. Since ∂R
∗
∂λ
> 0 and ∂T
∂λ
< 0, by equation
??, it must be that ∂D2H
∂λ
> 0.
Since Table 1 assumes that PH ≥ PM , we need to show that this is true. Since PH = R∗ and D2M = 0, it
suffices to show that R∗ ≥ λYM . The function F (λYM , λ) = x(K + Z − YHYM pH)− λYM is strictly decreasing in λ
and F (λ3YM , λ3) = 0. Therefore F (λYM , λ) > 0 for λ < λ3. But since FR < 0,it must be that R
∗(λ) > λYM for
all λ < λ3.
Now, we prove that contract is feasible, i.e., that 0 ≤ qM ≤ 1 and D2H ≥ 0. First, we consider qM . Since
F (x(K+ pL− pH), λ2) = 0, then R∗(λ2) = x(K+ pL− pH). Plugging the value of λ2 and that of R∗ in equations
?? and ??, leads to T = pL or qM = 0. Since
∂qM
∂λ
< 0, then for λ ≤ λ2, qM > 0. The result that qM ≤ 1 follows
from Z ≤ pL + pM . In the range considered D2H ≥ 0. Since R∗(λ1) = λ1YH then at λ = λ1, D2H = 0. D2H ≥ 0
follows from the result shown above that ∂D2H
∂λ
> 0.
Finally, given the equilibrium, we solve for entrepreneur j’s optimal deviation (qjs, D
j
2s)s=H,M . Since R
∗ >
λYM for the range considered then r
j
M = 0 regardless of D
j
2M . We set D
j
2M = 0. By setting D
j
2H = λYH −R∗, the
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entrepreneur raises one unit with probability 1 (rjH = 1). The entrepreneur does not gain by lowering D
j
2H since
doing so leaves rjH unchanged and the entrepreneur needs to raise q
j
M to compensate the date t0 investor. Also,
the entrepreneur does not gain by increasing Dj2H since, in that case, P
j
H < R
∗ and rjH = 0. This would decrease
his payoff and would require more liquidation to compensate the date t0 investor as well. From the participation
constraint (it holds with equality) it follows that qjM =
Z− pHD2H
R̂
−pL
pM
. Since (qjs, D
j
2s)s=H,M = (qs, D2s)s=H,M ,
we have, in fact, an equilibrium.
Step 7 (proof of part b.3): If pL < Z ≤ pL + pH YHYM − pH , then for λ > λ2, every entrepreneur sets qM = 0,
D2M = 0, D2H =
R̂(Z−pL)
pH
, where R̂ =

x(K + pL − pH) if λYM < x(K + pL − pH)
λYM
if x(K + pL − pH) ≤ λYM ≤
≤ x(K + pL − pH − pM )
x(K + pL − pH − pM ) if λYM > x(K + pL − pH − pM )
First, we compute the equilibrium. Since qM = 0 then T = pL. Now, we show that PH ≥ x(K+ pL− pH) for
all λ covered in case b.3. Consider V = PH −x(K+pL−pH) = λYH − R̂(Z−pL)pH −x(K+pL−pH). Now, R̂(λ2) =
x(K+pL−pH). Because if Z < pL+pH YHYM −pH (or 1+
Z−pL
pH
< YH
YM
) then λ2YM =
x(K+pL−pH )
YH

1 + Z−pL
pH
YM <
x(K + pL− pH) and so R̂(λ2) = x(K + pL− pH), and if Z = pL+ pH YHYM − pH (or 1+
Z−pL
pH
= YH
YM
) then λ2YM =
x(K+pL−pH )
YH
1 + Z−pL
pH
YM = x(K+pL−pH) and again R̂(λ2) = λYM = (K+pL−pH). Function V evaluated at
λ2 is λ2YH− x(K+pL−pH )(Z−pL)pH −x(K+pL−pH) = x(K+pL−pH) 1 +
Z−pL
pH
−x(K+pL−pH) 1 + Z−pLpH = 0.
Now ∂V
∂λ
= YH − ∂R̂∂λ (Z−pL)pH ≥ YH −
∂R̂
∂λ
YH
YM
− 1 ≥ YH − YM YHYM − 1 = 1, where the first inequality follows
from the definition of case b.3 and the second inequality follows because ∂R̂
∂λ
≤ YM . Thus, in all the range of λ
considered PH ≥ x(K + pL − pH). Since PH ≥ x(K + pL − pH), PM = λYM , and T = pL then comparing the
definition of R̂ with R∗ from cases 3,4, and 5 of Table 1, leads to R∗ = R̂. In addition, in this case (b.3), rH = 1.
Second, an entrepreneur has no incentives to deviate since this contract allows him not to liquidate the type
M project. Also by setting D2M = 0, the entrepreneur maximizes his probability of receiving capital when his
project is of type M .
Step 8 (proof of part c.3): If Z − pH YHYM > pL − pH , then for λ3 ≤ λ ≤ λ4 (this region is non-empty), every
entrepreneur sets (qM , D2M ) = (
Z− pHD2H
R̂
−pL
pM
, 0) and (qH , D2H) = (0, λYH − R̂), where R̂ = λYM .
Again, we first compute the equilibrium. The total amount of liquidation is T = pL+ pMqM = Z− pHD2H
R̂
=
Z − pHYH
YM
+ pH . Since λ ≥ λ3, then PM = λYM ≥ x(K + Z − pH YHYM ) = x(K + T − pH) and so this case falls
under case 4 of Table 1. Since we are in case 4, R∗ = λYM , rH = 1 and rM =
K+T−pH−x−1(λYM )
pM
. Note that rM
is strictly increasing in λ. At λ = λ3, rM = 0 and at λ = λ4, rM = 1.
We need to check whether the contract is feasible. We show that D2H ≥ 0 and 0 ≤ qM ≤ 1. First,
D2H = λYH − λYM > 0. Now, qM =
Z− pHYH
YM
+pH−pL
pM
> 0 by the definition of this step (Z − pH YHYM > pL − pH).
Also, since Z− pHYH
YM
+pH−pL ≤ Z−pL ≤ pM (the last inequality follows from our assumption that Z ≤ pL+pM )
then qM < 1.
Finally, given the equilibrium, we solve for entrepreneur j’s optimal deviation (qjs, D
j
2s)s=H,M . Just as in step
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6, there is no profitable deviation from Dj2H = λYH −R∗. Also for Dj2M = 0, rjM ∈ [0, 1] whereas any deviation to
Dj2M > 0, would lead to r
j
M = 0 (since P
j
M < λYM = R
∗) and is therefore not profitable. Given these values ofDj2H
and Dj2M , q
j
M satisfies the participation constraint with equality. Finally, since (q
j
s, D
j
2s)s=H,M = (qs, D2s)s=H,M ,
we have, in fact, an equilibrium.
Step 9 (proof of part b.4): If Z − pH YHYM > pL − pH , then for λ4 < λ < λ5, every entrepreneur sets
(qM , D2M ) = (
Z− λ
R̂
(pHYH+pMYM )−pL+pM+pH
pM (2− λR̂YM )
, λYM − R̂) and (qH , D2H) = (0, λYH − R̂), where R̂ satisfies x(K +
2(pL + pMqM (R̂))− 1) = R̂.
The proof of this step is almost identical to step 6. So we do not repeat is here. The equilibrium R∗ = R̂. In
this case, rH = rM = 1. Also, qM > 0 for λ < λ5 and qM = 0 for λ = λ5.
Step 10 (proof of part b.5): If Z − pH YHYM > pL − pH then for λ > λ5, qM = 0, and D2M and D2H can be
anything that satisfies pMD2M + pHD2H + pLR̂ = ZR̂ and D2s ≤ λYs − R̂ for s = H,M where R̂ is defined by
R̂ = x(K + pL − pH − pM ).
First, we find the equilibrium. Since qM = 0 then T = pL. The definition of D2s guarantees that P s ≥ R̂.
Then, since P s = R̂ = x(K + pL − pH − pM ) we are in case 5 of Table 1. From the Table, R∗ = x(K +
pL − pH − pM ) = R̂. To check whether the contract is feasible we need to show that there are D2H and
D2M that satisfy 0 ≤ D2s ≤ λYs − R̂ for s = H, M and pMD2M + pHD2H + pLR̂ = ZR̂. First, λYM − R̂ >
λ5YM − R̂ = R̂pHYH+pMYM [ZYM + YM (−pL + pH + pM )− pHYH − pMYM ] > 0, where the first equality follows
from the definition of λ5 and the second from the condition that Z − pH YHYM > pL − pH . Since λYH − R̂ >
λYM − R̂ > 0, it is possible to have D2s > 0 for s = H,M . The minimum value that pMD2M + pHD2H + pLR̂
takes is pLR̂ < ZR̂ when D2H = D2M = 0. The maximum value is pM (λYM − R̂) − pH(λYH − R̂) + pLR̂ >
λ5(pMYM + pHYH) − R̂(pL − pH − pM ) = R̂(Z − pL + pH + pM ) − R̂(pL − pH − pM ) = R̂Z. Thus there are
non-negative values for D2H and D2M such that pMD2M +pHD2H+pLR̂ = ZR̂ and D2s ≤ λYs− R̂ for s = H,M .
With the proposed contract, an entrepreneur does not liquidate when the project is of type M or H. In
addition, the entrepreneur always raises capital for sure with these two types of projects. Since R∗ = R̂, the
contract satisfies the investor’s participation constraint. Thus an entrepreneur cannot do better.
Proof of Proposition ??
For Z < pL + pM , qH = 0 and therefore aggregate payoff can be written as:
Π = pH(1 + rH)YH + pM (1− qM )(1 + rM )YM + ωx(ω),
where ω = K + pL + pMqM − pHrH − pM (1− qM )rM .
In region (a), qM = qH = 0 (so T = pL), and D2H = D2M = 0 so PH = λYH and PM = λYM . Using PH ,
PM and T = pL in Table 1, it can be readily seen that rH and rM are weakly increasing in λ. Since
d
dω
(ωx(ω)) =
x(ω) + ωx′(ω) < YM < YH , then ∂Π∂rH = pH [YH −
d
dω
(ωx(ω))] > 0 and ∂Π
∂rM
= pM (1− qM )[YM − ddω (ωx(ω))] > 0.
Therefore, in this region, dΠ
dλ
≥ 0. Finally, in this region, the equilibrium is independent of Z, and so dΠ
dZ
= 0.
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In region b.1 and c.1, qH = 0, qM = (Z − pL)/pM (so T = Z) PH = λYH , PM = λYM . Letting λ0 =
x(K + Z)/YH < λ1and using Table 1 we obtain that rH =
 0 if λ < λ0[K + Z − x−1(λYH)]/pH if λ0 ≤ λ ≤ λ1 , and
rM = 0. As before, rH is weakly increasing in λ and so
dΠ
dλ
≥ 0. For λ < λ0, dΠdZ = −YM + ddω (ωx(ω)) < 0. For
λ0 ≤ λ ≤ λ1, dΠdZ = YH − YM > 0.
Now we analyze region b.2 and c.2. In the proof of Lemma ??, we showed that, in this region rM = 0,
rH = 1 and
∂qM
∂λ
< 0. Inside this region, an increase in λ or Z does not affect the equilibrium allocation rH or
rM but it does affect the amount of liquidation qM . Since
∂qM
∂λ
< 0, then dΠ
dλ
= pM [−YM + ddω (ωx(ω))] ∂qM∂λ > 0.
To obtain the effect of Z on qM , consider first the effect of Z on the equilibrium return R
∗. Recall that, in this
region, F (R, λ, Z) = x(K + Z − λYH
R
pH) − R and R∗ is such that F (R∗, λ, Z) = 0. By the implicit function
theorem, ∂R
∗
∂Z
= −FZ
FR
< 0. This implies that R∗ = x(K + T − pH) so that it must be the case that ∂T∂Z > 0. Since
qM = (T − pL)/pM then ∂qM∂Z > 0 and so dΠdZ < 0.
In region b.3, qM = qH = 0 and so T = pL. Using the fact that T = pL, PM = λYM and PH ≥ X(K+pL−pH)
(see proof of Lemma ??) the allocation rH and rM can be derived. In case b.3, rH = 1 and rM is (weakly) increasing
in λ and are not affected by Z. Since rH and rM are not affected by Z,
dΠ
dZ
= 0. Also, higher levels of λ leads to
(weakly) higher rM and so
dΠ
dλ
≥ 0.
In region c.3, qM does not change with λ (see proof of Lemma ??), rH = 1 and rM is increasing in λ and so
dΠ
dλ
> 0. In this region ∂qM
∂Z
= ∂rM
∂Z
= 1
pM
and dΠ
dZ
= −(qM + rM )(YM − ddω (ωx(ω))) < 0.
Region c.4 is similar to b.2 and region c.5 is similar to c.3.
Proof of Proposition ??
Direct application of Lemma ??, with C being the set of projects that are not liquidated and that belong to
conglomerates that do not opt out of the external capital market, leads to:
rH =

0 if λYH < x(K + T )
K+T−x−1(λYH )
pH−cpLpH if x(K + T ) ≤ λYH < x(K + T − pH + cpLpH)
1 if λYH ≥ x(K + T − pH + cpLpH)
rHM =

0 if λYHM < x(K + T − pH + cpLpH)
K+T−pH+cpLpH−x−1(λYHM )
cpHpM
if x(K + T − pH + cpLpH) ≤ λYHM <
< x(K + T − pH + cpLpH − cpMpH)
1 if λYHM ≥ x(K + T − pH + cpLpH − cpMpH)
rM =

0 if λYM < x(K + T − pH + cpLpH − cpMpH)
K+T−−pH+cpLpH−cpHpM−x−1(λYM )
(1−c)pM+cp2M
if x(K + T − pH + cpLpH − cpMpH) ≤ λYM <
< x(K + T − pH + cpLpH − cpMpH − (1− c)pM − cp2M )
1 if λYM ≥ x(K + T − pH + cpLpH − cpMpH − (1− c)pM − cp2M )
where YHM ≡ (YH + YM )/2. The definition of rH , rHM and rM motivate the definition of the following
functions of λ : λ˜1 = x(K + T )/YH , λ˜2 = x(K + T − pH + cpLpH)/YH , λ˜3 = x(K + T − pH + cpLpH)/YHM ,
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λ˜4 = x(K + T − pH + cpLpH − cpMpH)/YHM , λ˜5 = x(K + T − pH + cpLpH − cpMpH)/YM and λ˜6 = x(K + T −
pH + cpLpH − cpMpH − (1− c)pM − cp2M )/YM . For any c, the value of these functions satisfy λ˜1 < λ˜2 < · · · < λ˜6.
To lighten notation we let r′t ≡ ∂rt∂c for t = H, HM, and M and f(ω) = ωx(ω). We analyze dΠdc in all the
regions defined by λ˜k k = 1, 2 . . . 6. We reproduce the expression for Π from the text:
Π = f(ω) + (1− c) [pH(YH + rHYH) + pM (YM + rMYM )]+
c
2
 p2H(2)(YH + rHYH) + p2M (2)(YM + rMYM ) + 2pHpM (2YH + rHYM + rHMYM )
+2pHpL(2YH) + 2pMpL(2YM )

where ω = K + (1− c)pL + cp2L − rH(pH − cpLpH)− rHM (cpHpM )− rM ((1− c)pM + cp2M ).
We denote by ∂Π
∂c
the derivative of Π wrt c assuming rH , rHM and rM are constants:
∂Π
∂c
= pLpH(1− rH)(YH − f ′(ω)) + pHpM (1− rH)(YH − YM )+ (14)
+ pM (1− pM )(1− rM )(YM − f ′(ω)) + pHpM (rHM − 1)(YM − f ′(ω))
For λ < λ˜1, rH = rHM = rM = 0 and since r
′
H = r
′
HM = r
′
M = 0 we can use equation ?? to obtain
dΠ
dc
= ∂Π
∂c
=
pLpH(YH − f ′(ω)) + pHpM (YH − YM ) + pMpL(YM − f ′(ω)) > 0 since f ′(ω) = x(ω) + ωx′(ω) ≤ x(ω) < YM < YH .
For λ˜1 < λ < λ˜2, rH ∈ (0, 1), rHM = 0 and rM = 0 also r′H 6= 0 and r′HM = r′M = 0. Also in this region, simple
algebra leads to ∂ω
∂c
= 0. Thus, dΠ
dc
= pLpH(1− rH)YH + pHpM (1− rH)(YH −YM )+ pMpLYM + r′H [(1− c)pHYH +
cp2HYH+cpHpMYM ] and r
′
H =
−pL+p2L+rHpHpL
pH−cpLpH . In the limit as λ→ λ˜2, rH → 1 and
dΠ
dc
= pMpLYM−pMpL[γYH+
(1 − γ)YM ] < 0 where γ = (1 − c + cpH)/(1 − cpL). Also ∂∂λ
 
dΠ
dc

= ∂
∂rH
 
dΠ
dc
∂rH
∂λ
. Since x() is a decreasing
function ∂rH
∂λ
is increasing. And since ∂
∂rH
 
dΠ
dc
= −pHpLYH − pHpM (YH − YM ) + pHpL[γYH + (1− γ)YM ] < 0
then ∂
∂λ
 
dΠ
dc
< 0.
If dΠ
dc λ˜1
≤ 0 then we define λ̂1 = λ˜1. If dΠdc λ˜1 > 0 then since ∂∂λ
 
dΠ
dc
< 0 and dΠ
dc λ˜2
< 0, there is a
λ∗ ∈ (λ˜1, λ˜2) such that dΠdc |λ∗ = 0. In this case we define λ̂1 = λ∗. We also define λ̂2 = λ˜2. So far we have shown
that to the left of λ̂1,
dΠ
dc
is positive, and from λ̂1 to λ̂2,
dΠ
dc
is negative. Left to prove is that to the right of λ̂2,
dΠ
dc
is non-negative.
For λ˜2 < λ < λ˜3, rH = 1, rHM = rM = 0 and r
′
H = r
′
HM = r
′
M = 0. Using equation ??,
dΠ
dc
= ∂Π
∂c
=
pMpL(YM − f ′(ω)) > 0.
For λ˜3 < λ < λ˜4, rH = 1, rHM ∈ (0, 1), rM = 0 and r′HM 6= 0 and r′H = r′M = 0. Also in this re-
gion, simple algebra leads to ∂ω
∂c
= 0. Thus, dΠ
dc
= pMpLYM + pHpMrHMYM + cpHpMr
′
HMYM and r
′
HM =
−pL+p2L−+pHpL+rHMpHpM
cpHpM
. Substituting the value of r′HM and simplifying leads to
dΠ
dc
= 0.
For λ˜4 < λ < λ˜5, rH = 1, rHM = 1, rM = 0 and r
′
H = r
′
HM = r
′
M = 0. Using equation ??,
dΠ
dc
= ∂Π
∂c
=
pM (1− pM )(YM − f ′(ω)) > 0
For λ˜5 < λ < λ˜6, rH = 1, rHM = 1, rM ∈ (0, 1) and r′M 6= 0 and r′HM = r′M = 0. Also in this region, simple
algebra leads to ∂ω
∂c
= 0. dΠ
dc
= pMpLYM + pHpMYM − pMrMYM + p2MrMYM + r′M ((1− c)pMYM + cp2MYM ) and
r′M =
−pL+p2L+pLpH−pHpM−rM (−pM+p2M )
(1−c)pM+cp2M
. Substituting the value of r′M and simplifying leads to
dΠ
dc
= 0.
46
Finally, for λ > λ˜6, rH = 1, rHM = 1, rM = 1 and r
′
H = r
′
HM = r
′
M = 0. Using equation ??,
dΠ
dc
= ∂Π
∂c
= 0.
Thus, to the right of λ̂2,
dΠ
dc
is non-negative.
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X(0)
R* = λYH
K + T 
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